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The Winding Road to Return to the Beauty of Indonesian Multiculturalism: A Discourse Analysis of ‘Back to Nagari’ in the Regional Autonomy Policy in West Sumatra

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SUBMISSION TRACK

Received: April 06, 2023
Final Revision: May 05, 2023
Available Online: May 10, 2023

KEYWORDS

Indonesia, multiculturalism, Minangkabau, regional autonomy, nagari

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A B S T R A C T

The plurality of Indonesia with more than 600 ethnics is a great wealth but has not been adequately rewarded. Various political, legal, and socio-cultural events have resulted in the degradation of diversity from a colorful mosaic to a blur. This article analyzes the discourse of ‘return to nagari’ based on texts of national commitments and policies on decentralization, West Sumatra’s local policies on the lowest government ‘nagari’, and public responses on them. The methods had been used are literature study and field research, which are analyzed based on the technique of discourse analysis which included text, context, and social practice. The findings are the policy on decentralization is still inconsistent, and the construction of the regional government’s policy based on local culture has not been ideal and operational formulated yet. In fact, it is not easy to return to indigenous culture as roots the Beauty of Indonesia’s Multiculturalism. This finding reflects the critical implication of the discursive practice that shows the awareness of actor’s membership in their culture that leads them to make clear cultural-political attitudes in relation to the state. The position of their cultural traditions is threatened and our position is to mobilize them to revive, maintain, keep, consolidate and revitalize their cultural identity.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Indonesia was founded based on the diversity not unity (Gonggong, 2002; Ardika, 2004) which represented in the motto ‘Unity in Diversity’. Those lovely words have inspired lessons in pluralism law for other multiethnic countries such as Canada (Tokawa, 2015) and some other countries. The discourse of ‘unity in diversity’, however, is often misinterpreted and remains problematic to this day. Discourse practices for that dialogue tend to emphasize ‘unity’ significantly and ignore ‘diversity’. As a result, the discourse on differences, identities, tribes/ethnicities, races, religions, and group identities has become an exclusive expression of national unity and a thread connecting the nation to the world (Abdullah, 2006; Tirtosudarmo, 2007).

There are 633 ethnics in Indonesia (BPS , 2015, Compared to: Geertz, 1981; Alisjahbana, 1988; Koentjaraningrat, 1993). From the time when national awareness was raised, Indonesia has needed 37 years to become independent of colonial power (1908-1945). Even after 76 years of independence, Indonesia is still testing the relevance of the diversity function. Two periods of trial can be considered: (a) 53 years to establish a more concrete commitment that Indonesia respects localism and diversity, namely from the proclamation to the fall of Suharto’s regime (1945-1998), and (b) 22 years since the Reformation Order began until today (1999-2021). As a result of the Reformation Order and the national commitment, a policy of regional autonomy has been established which has been embodied in the constitution of

the regional government. The constitution has been revised four times so far. This indicates that managing diversity as a wealth requires a long-term adaptive effort. Even President Joko Widodo also campaigned the slogan: ‘Sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), Unity in Diversity, the 1945 Constitution, is undisputed!’ (Kompas.com, 2019), yet the emergence of variety in Indonesia remains a complex issue.

As part of the policy of regional autonomy, the program of “Return to Nagari” is being pursued. As a traditional concept, the word ‘nagari’ refers to a community of several thousand people who are socially and politically united within the highest matrilineal territory of the Minangkabau. Nagaris can therefore be considered a ‘state’ since they are led by a ‘Chief Council’, which is comprised of clan chiefs representing their clans and has a mandate to establish a government (executive) and legislative body. Nagaris are autonomous; there are no structural links between them, and no centralizing administration or federal power exists. Leaders of the *nagari* act to represent their own groups, not to represent the king of Pagaruyung. Until the 14th century, the kings of Pagaruyung were merely symbols of the union between Minangkabau territories (de Jong, 1960; Marsden, 1870; Oki, 1977; Abdullah, 1966). The socio-political structure of Minangkabau has therefore been compared by many scholars to that of the ancient Greek ‘city state’ (Mansyur et. al, 1970). This identification is based on the fact that each *nagari* acts as a mini-republic free from federal control (Zed, 1996). As a sociopolitical group, *nagari* have three characteristics, namely autonomy, democracy, and decentralization (Manan, 2003).

According to empirical data, there were 541 *nagari* in West Sumatra in 1911 (Westenenk, 1918; compare Kato, 1989) and 543 *nagari* in 1979. The existence of *nagari* with a specific governmental system dates back thousands of years. It is based on the assumption that the evolution of a *nagari* takes 108 years (a *nagari* consists of at least four tribes, and each tribe is made up of at least six generations, and each generation is made up of 18 years). Based on a simple calculation, the 543 *nagari* in 1979 are assumed to be the result of 9 mutation levels (assuming that one *nagari* generates one *nagari* each mutation cycle), so the range of time required is $9 \times 108 \text{ years} = 972 \text{ years}$. In fact, such a calculation is relatively inaccurate, as Westenenk’s

1911 find indicated that only 2 (two) *nagari* were added in West Sumatra during 68 years.

The *nagari* have been influenced by external interventions for 200 years. There was a first intervention in the 1820s, when the Dutch colonial government gained access to the civil war that was fought between *Kaum Adat* and puritan *Paderi* and ultimately won by the Dutch in 1837 (Beckmann, 1979; Westenenk, 1918; Kielstra, 1887, Dobbin, 1977). Following Indonesian independence (1945), the second intervention involved introducing new elements to the Nagari institution, abolishing the *nagari* governance by combining the 543 *nagari* into 78 autonomous regions (1950), revitalizing the Nagari autonomous system (1955), restructuring the Nagari administration system (1962), separating the Nagari from its administration (1963), and so forth until the New Order era. (Hasbi, 1990). During the Suharto administration (New Order), a significant intervention occurred concerning the Village Administration which was embodied in Constitution 5/1979. This constitution changed the *nagari* into villages similar to those in Java (543 *nagari* became 3.516 villages). Additionally, this constitution led to the creation of local regulation no 13/1989, which eliminated the role of the *Nagari* as the lowest administrative unit and reduced the administrative territory (village was replaced by the *Nagari*). The intervention of Suharto was far more systematic than that of the colonial government. However, the core pillars of matrilineal culture remain dominant as a framework of ideology, law, and institution (Beckmann and Keebet, 2013). As a result of a long and difficult process, the regional autonomy policy was issued and West Sumatra enthusiastically accepted it. Vel and A.W. Bedner assert that the process of establishing regional autonomy in West Sumatra is quite unique and will never be replicated in other regions. As they states, the “return to *nagari*” is the result of a long historical process that is unique to the Minangkabau people. While sceptical, they expressed doubt that such a process could be successful (Vel and Bedner, 2015).

In this paper, the objectives are to analyze and explain ‘return to *Nagari*’ with regard to West Sumatra’s reformation-era policy, (b) to explain the intertextual discourse ‘return to *Nagari*’ in the context of regional autonomy policy, (c) to analyze and explain the discourse practice of ‘return to *Nagari*’ at its implementation level. Furthermore,

this article utilizes a critical social science paradigm to describe the existence of *nagari* (descriptive function) and formulate a recommendation to implement a proper model (prescriptive function). The hypothesis is that the discourse of 'return to *Nagari*' represents the facts about the identity and ethnicity struggles of Minangkabau people in West Sumatra. This is crucial for managing and implementing diversity as a wealth to create a harmonious and rich multicultural environment in Indonesia.

II. METHODS

As part of the research project sponsored by the Educational Fund Institution of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, this article is entitled *Developing Nagari Governance as a Model for Implementing Customary Values into Customary Village Governance*. This research involves several researchers from three different disciplines, including Sociology, Law, and Cultural Discourse. Project duration is three years (2019-2022), with the aim of reconstructing and revitalizing the *nagari* governance system in West Sumatra, Indonesia. The purpose of this research is to find an original model based on the study of text, intertexts, and contexts, as well as the offer from discourse construction as a social construction that will be beneficial to research subjects in the near future. Upon completion of this discourse analysis, an academic manuscript will form the basis for the local government regulation that will determine the policy and governance of the local government of West Sumatra, which may also be applicable to other Indonesian provinces. Thus, the local model is strengthened within the national multicultural constellation in Indonesia as a result of this policy.

This study used some data samples taken from some fields, containing texts related to the policies of decentralization or regional autonomy that were published during the reformation period, beginning with the second amendment of the 1945 Constitution (national commitment text). As a result of its implementation in the local government constitution (national policy), as well as the local government regulations in West Sumatra (local policy), and the responses of its implementation in the local policy on *nagari* governance with the existing models, the national policy was adopted. There are six research sites participating in the field research, representing the regions of *Luhak* (the

origin and the core culture of Minangkabau in West Sumatra) and *Rantau* (the expansion territory along the coast of Sumatra Island that covers the high and low lands). Each territory is represented by one *nagari*. The six samples are also representative of two different systems of governance, namely democratic and aristocratic. Participants are divided into packets for a focus group discussion (FGD). During FGD, some topics about autonomy are discussed with the actors (regions and customary lands), democracy (population, institution, function, representative system, leader election, decision making) and decentralization (reflection of multiculturalism). Based on the analysis of text, intertextual relations, discourse practice, and contexts, a discourse construction is proposed as an alternative solution to the subject's problems.

In this article, discourse is viewed as a determinant in social construction from a social constructivism perspective (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). It is therefore important to note that discourse studies are not only closely related to linguistics, but also to communication, social, political, legal, and cultural issues. A recent study by Gee suggests that discourse can mediate productive relationships in situations of polarization, conflict, and conflicting viewpoints (Gee, 2016). Similarly, Sawirman explains the unique characteristics of smallholder discourse on plantations and offers cultural solutions to regional conflicts in the oil palm sector (Sawirman, 2017).

A number of discourse paradigms are incorporated into this article, particularly the discourse nodal point (Laclau, 1985; 2001), three way discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1993; 1995) and cultural discourse (Shi-xu, 2005; 2006; 2009, Scollo, 2011). As described by Laclau and Mouffe, a nodal point is a point of crystallization within a social discourse as well as symbols that have a special status in relation to other symbols in that discourse. It is an empty symbol, which does not provide any specific meaning until it is embedded in a specific discourse. The meaning can be derived from different approaches (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002,). As Fairclough emphasizes, discourse plays an important role in reconstructing that reality in terms of social identity, social relation, as well as knowledge system and meaning. Consequently, he argues that discourse is composed of three dimensions, namely texts, discursive practice, and social practice (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002).

Furthermore, Shi-xu contributes a strong background to sound the local aspiration as a differentiating and enriching factor for multicultural national and global universities as we face and challenge the current trend of globalization. As outlined in Shi-xu (2009), the components of the East Discourse Study are: (1) local base and global atmosphere, (2) indication of its own intellectual identity, (3) reflective, and (4) dialogic. As indicated in the first principle, there is a benefit to extending the scope of inclusive and pluralistic cultural concepts beyond the limit of historical awareness. This requires the development of a multicultural attitude through an appreciation of cultural diversity (including intellectual culture) and mutual respect. It is also important to support the struggle for equal human welfare during a period of global capitalism, neocolonialism, and intense international confrontation (Shi-xu, 2006). Additionally, the second principle stresses its own cultural intellectual identity: cherished philosophical ideas, concepts, theories, and methods. The third principle is reflexive, namely the requirement that researchers of multicultural discourse should not be satisfied with descriptions and explanations as they are, but need to offer prescriptions or suggestions on how they should be in the form of new discourse constructions that can help change repressive and stereotypical discourses and are beneficial for Eastern societies as well as mankind in general. Shi-xu emphasized the need to pay particular attention to indigenous discourses as part of the Eastern paradigm. Lastly, the objective of East-West dialogue is to understand and learn from one another, which facilitates intercultural communication.

Throughout this article, the discourse of 'return to *Nagari*' serves as a nodal point. The text remains empty and will be meaningful once embedded into a particular discourse, in this case the discourse of decentralization or regional autonomy in Indonesia. The decentralization discourse is derived from the context of Suharto's fall, which is followed by the national commitment embodied in the Second Amendment to the 1945 Constitution, which recognizes and appreciates the customary law communities and their traditional rights, and further supports this by a national decentralization program followed by a local government policy that focuses on the system of *nagari* governance.

III. RESULTS

Text, Intertext and Context

After the constitution 22/1999 on regional autonomy was adopted, texts promoting a return to *Nagari* emerged. That text consists of three words, i.e. '*kembali* (return)'. '*ke* (to)', and '*nagari* (administrative region and its socio cultural system)'. The word '*kembali*' means 'return to the previous state'. '*Ke*' means 'pointing in the right direction'. '*Nagari*' refers to an administrative region, traditional community system, and highest social politic in the Minangkabau social culture. Therefore, the text '*kembali ke nagari*' means 'return to *Nagari*' as the original place. Soon after the 2000s, both in West Sumatra and among overseas Minangkabaus, that text became a jargon and became widely used. To this day, the discourse has evolved into a discourse that persists with fluctuating intensity depending on the socio-political context that emerges locally and nationally.

As a 'nodal point', this text has a special status symbol, but it is hollow and will have detailed significance when incorporated into a specific discourse, the discourse of regional autonomy. Indonesia's 1998 reforms demanded widespread regional autonomy. During the reform process, a bloody event marked the end of the 32-year authoritarian rule of Suharto. Following the fall of Suharto, Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie became the new president. As a result of Abdurrahman Wahid's resignation (post-Habibie), Prof. Ryaas Rashid was appointed Minister of State with a specialization in Regional Autonomy. During this period, Indonesia began implementing its regional autonomy policy.

The text of legal products incorporates regional autonomy policies. As a result of a complex and challenging discursive process, legal products are the outcome of a political process. It is not intended to focus on and present problematic texts in the political process. This study focuses exclusively on the analysis of legal products as comparative texts through the use of intertextual analysis. As a result of decentralization, there are three levels of political and legal policy texts. As a result of the national commitment, four amendments to the Constitution of 1945 were enacted. The four dates were 21 October 1999, 18 August 2000, 9 November 2001, and 10 August 2002, respectively. A specific reference to the centralistic recognition can be found in the second amendment in articles 18, 18A,

and 18B. Secondly, the national policy as a result of the implementation of the national commitment was realized in the form of a law product known as the Regional Autonomy Law. There are four legal products for this, i.e. UU 22/1999, UU 32/2004, UU 23/2014 and UU 2/2015; complemented by UU 6 2014 concerning the Village. Third, the local policy implements the national policy through the local government regulation on Nagari Governance, which has produced three legal documents, namely Local Constitutions 9/2000, 2/2007, and 7/2018.

National Commitment

According to the national commitments, the state recognizes and respects the customary law community units, as well as their traditional privileges, as long as their existence is in accordance with the principles of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as governed by (UUD 1945, article 18, paragraph 2). There is a counter-discourse to the policy of ‘unification’ of the previous regime in this statement. Indonesia was perceived as being pushed towards a ‘unified’ state under both the Old Order (Sukarno) and the New Order (Suharto), so the historical and substantial fact that Indonesia was composed of hundreds of different ethnicities had to be abolished. Even expressions of ethnicity and religious group identity were accompanied by threats of accusations of racism (SARA), which may result in criminal charges. Therefore, the reformation offers a fresh perspective on celebrating diversity and showcasing its beauty.

National Policy

The national policy referred to here is related to two things; they are regional and village autonomies. Regional Autonomy was originally conceived as ‘the authority of the regions to regulate and manage the interests of the local community according to their own initiative based on the aspirations of the community (Constitution 22/1999, article 1 letter h). However, it was later expanded to be ‘rights, authority, and obligation’ (Constitution 32/2004, article 1 point 5). On one side, it indicates that the central government recognizes that ‘to regulate and manage the local community interest’ is not only an authority but also the right and obligation of the regional autonomous region. This means that local governments are given rights and are also bound by responsibilities. Besides that, there is a deletion of a phrase ‘to regulate based on its own initiation to

meet with community aspiration’ replaced it with ‘to regulate and manage its own government affairs and the local community interests’. The deletion of the phrase ‘according to its own initiation based the local community interest’ indicates the central government again limits the rights, the authority, and the obligation of the regional autonomy governance to only ‘government affairs’ allowed. Finally (according to Constitution 23/2014, article 1 number 6) added the key phrase ‘in the system of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia’. This reflects the central government’s worries for the regional government which, if given very broad authority, could result in disintegration or secession, as has happened in the province of East Timor during the Habibie administration (30 August 1999) to become the State of Timor Leste.

During the reformation era, the concept of village was deconstructed from the concept of village during the New Order era, which was regulated under Constitution 5/1979, which defined village as a unit of residence occupied by a number of inhabitants, including legal community units with the lowest government organization directly under the Camat (subdistrict head) and the right to run their own households within the boundaries of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. According to Law 22/1999 (the first version of the reform), the village concept covers: (i) a law community unit, (ii) has the authority to regulate and manage local community interests, (iii) is based on origin and (iv) local custom, (v) is recognized by the National Administration system, and (vi) is within the district. According to the Law 32/2004 (article 1 number 12), there is an additional element ‘having territorial boundaries’ after (i) and the phrase ‘and respected’ has been added to the element (v), while element (vi) has been removed. Constitution 6/2014 (article 1 letter 1) and Constitution 23/2014 (article 1 number 43) add the phrases “traditional village,” “administration affairs,” and “based on community initiation, rights of origin, and/or traditional rights.”. The above textual phenomenon demonstrates that there is a conceptual improvement, but at the same time restrict the authority on the ‘administration affairs’. Hence, community initiation, right of origin and/or traditional rights can only be conferred at the level of a customary village, not at the level of an autonomous region (region or province).

The central government generally delegated

authority to the autonomous region with some limitations and efforts to maintain a balance. Besides, it is suggested by the above texts, it is also found in other important texts in the explanation of Constitution 23/2014, which says: ‘...must be able to maintain and keep the unity of the state territories in supporting the existence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, ‘... the sovereignty is only held by the national government, not by the regional government’, ‘... as long as it does not conflict with the national law order and public interest’ and ‘The central government in making a policy must consider the local wisdoms, and the Region also considers the national interests’. Regional autonomy extends beyond the authority of the central government, including foreign policy, defense, security, justice, monetary and fiscal policies. And religion (Article 7 (1) UU 22/2009, Article 10 (3) UU 32/2004, Article 19 (1) UU 23/2014).

Local Policy

There are three relevant topics: the concept, the structure, and the decision-making process. *Nagari* is a concept that indicates a thorough understanding of that matter. The term ‘customary law community unit’ has been used in three provincial regulations that regulate it. Provincial Regulation 9/2000, verse 1 letter g emphasizes five major differences: a combination of several clans; a certain territory; a right to control and manage their household; and the right to elect their leader. In Provincial Regulation 2/2007, verse 1 number 7, the clan, wealth, and election of the leader are not specifically mentioned; rather, the focus is on cultural philosophy, origin, and custom. The Provincial Regulation 7/2018, verse 1 number 2 incorporates both the above-mentioned Provincial Regulations and adds the word ‘genealogy and history’ along with the requirement for the election of the leader by consensus. Three provincial regulations have demonstrated improvements on the concept of *nagari*.

As mentioned above, the three Provincial Regulations on *Nagari* present a change in the governance structure of the *Nagari*. According to Provincial Regulation 9/2000, *Nagari* institutions are comprised of four elements (PN, BPAN, BMASN, and LAN), followed by three elements (WN, BAMUS, and KAN) in Provincial Regulation 2/2007, and remained in these three elements with

different nomenclature and substance in Provincial Regulation 7/2018. A fundamental difference between the three Provincial Regulations is that in Provincial Regulation 9/2000, the Headman, Public Figure and Clan Chief are referred to the Consultative Institution (BMASN) and the *Nagari* Customary Court for Assets and Wealth (LAN). In Provincial Regulation 2/2007, they are referred to as KAN (the Highest *Nagari* Customary Assembly). In both Provincial Regulations, the Headman/Public Figure/ Clan Chief are placed only as supporting elements to maintain and resolve the customary disputes, while the authorities are those of the *Nagari* Head (PN/WN, the Executive Institution) and *Nagari* Representative and Consultative Institution (BAPAN/BAMUS, the Legislative Institution). There is a significant change in Provincial Regulation 7/2018, which places Headman / Public Figure / Clan Chief in KAN as a Legislative Institution.

The decision-making system, especially in the election of the Head of *Nagari* Governance (executive), has been changed from direct regulation 9/2000 to consultation and consensus regulation 7/2018 verse 7 (2). In the Provincial Regulation 7/2018, the Headman / Public Figure / matriclan chief is delegated full authority as the head of the *Nagari* Customary Assembly (KAN) as the official representative of the *Nagari* people. It is important to note that the direct democratic system that has been adopted from the liberal democratic system is being challenged by changing it to consultation and consensus, the original characteristics of the Minangkabau social political system, in order to replace direct elections (one man one vote) for all Heads of Government (from President to Village Head).

Social Practice

A majority of the actors in the field are in favor of decentralization and regional autonomy, which are summarized in the policy discourse of ‘returning to the *nagari*’ and the changes that are anticipated in the near future. According to the FGDs that were conducted, a variety of responses were found. The oral responses of the actors (142 people) were quantified for some of the topics discussed, which indicated a rejection of ‘foreign cultural indicators’ in the context of the *nagari* they understood and a strong desire to confirm their own cultural identity.

A number of actors stated that the nagari governance model since the 1999 reform does not adhere to the traditional concept of nagari: the clan chief role does not exist, the adat institution (KAN) does not function as a channel and reservoir for tiered aspirations and participation in decision-making. By rejecting the voting system, the actors lead to a process of deliberation and consensus. Their objection is if the dispute is directed to positive law enforcement and the settlement is regulated by custom through deliberation or a

customary court. The original nagari government system is also expected to maintain the issue of clan land.

Nevertheless, if the data on Table 1 tend to be *black and white* because the comparison between agree and disagree is so extreme, the data on Table 2 tend to be relatively balanced.

There are several related topics, including the establishment of the Traditional Institution (KAN), which includes other elements besides the

Table 1. Confirmation of identity and rejection of foreign cultural indicators.

No	Statement	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)
1	The system and structure of the Nagari government that is running according to Provincial Regulation 2/2007 has been in accordance with local customs		89,5
2	The chief of <i>nagari</i> enables uncle to play his role to the nephews		97
3	KAN (nagari customary institution) is not used as an institution to accommodate community aspirations which are channelled genealogically in stages	81	
4	KAN (nagari customary institution) is not involved in decision making by the chief of Nagari	86,7	
5	Voting is not a reflection of Minangkabau culture	94	
6	The head of the Nagari must come from the original son of the Nagari	94,3	
7	The election of the Nagari Head is carried out directly (one man one vote)		59
8	If the Head of the Nagari is elected by KAN by consensus, it will cause conflict		92,2
9	Settlement of disputes in the community is left to the state's positive law apparatus		92,2
10	Customary Courts need to be established at the nagari level	86	
11	Clan's assets are managed by the nagari community in accordance with customary provisions	88,8	
12	The Nagari Government System can protect the customary rights of the indigenous peoples	88,1	

Description: N=142

Table 2. Polarization of the actor attitudes on the topic of KAN membership as a deliberative institution and deliberative system in decision making.

No	Statement	Agree (%)	Neutral (%)	Disagree (%)
1	According to Provincial Regulation 7/2018, the membership of KAN consists of clan chief, religious public figure, female public figure, youth (previously only consisted of clan chief)	53	23	24
2	Voting method in decision making (whereas voting itself is admittedly not a reflection of Minangkabau culture (94%).	51	6	43
3	The head of the nagari should be directly elected by the community (Provincial Regulation 2/2007)	16	25	59
4	The head of the nagari is appointed through the clan chief/KAN deliberations (Provincial Regulation 7/2018)	38,7	24,6	36,7
5	Dispute resolution in the community should be done through deliberation	40,1	30	26,5
6	Disputes within the family are resolved in stages from the smallest/lowest family unit to a wider/higher family unit (Minangkabau customary system)	36	38	26,5

Description: N=142

clan chief, namely intellectuals (*cadiak pandai*), religious public figures (*alim ulama*), female public figures (*bundo kanduang*), and youth (*parik paga*) (according to Provincial Regulation 7/2018), supported by over half of the actors. As for decision-making procedures, half of the actors were in agreement with the voting method, despite admitting that it did not reflect their culture. The direct election of the Nagari Head (one man one vote) was rejected by more than half of the actors but was determined by KAN by deliberation and was only supported by a third of them. About half of the actors support the resolution of disputes through deliberation, while the settlement of disputes within the family in stages following kinship units is perceived as neutral by the same number of actors. Based on these data, it can be concluded that polarization has taken place in the discussion of the topics mentioned above. It is believed that such polarization indicates a shift in the understanding of the values system of Minangkabau culture by the actors, of which the majority are younger generations who have not lived under the nagari system of governance (Backmann and Keebet, 2006). It has also been reported that the family ties have changed as well as that there may be a shift overseas (Kato, 1978).

IV. DISCUSSION

As illustrated above, the discourse 'return to Nagari' is present in the local policy texts of West Sumatra, where the Nagari is regulated by (a) the national commitment to recognize and respect the customary law community units and their traditional rights, and (b) the national policy on regional autonomy and village government. There have been three changes to the local policy, but the proper format has yet to be determined. There are several indicators, such as (i) changes in the national policy regarding the decentralization, which represents the re-restriction of authority. It indicates that the policy is 'half-baked' and reflected the worries on the practice of decentralization will go too far and threaten the national interest and state's sovereignty, (ii) the fact that the intensive intervention during two hundred years has placed the *nagari* in Minangkabau about to vanish, and (iii) the making of local policy also undergoes some difficulties in formulating the model for the proper *nagari* government: ideal, functional, and operational, because of the material infrastructure,

social structure, and super structural ideology of the *nagari* have shifted. It demonstrates that Indonesia still has some problems with localism-nationalism, so the Minangkabau community still struggles to preserve its ethnic identity with two orientations: government identity and Indonesian cultural enrichment.

There are a number of internal and external factors that contribute to the above realities. A significant internal factor is the claim of ideology to preserve cultural identity. The Minangkabau cultural identity is the world's largest matrilineal, egalitarian, and proto-democratic community. In accordance with the principle *Indak itam dek arang, bukan kuniang dek kunik, bapantang lamak dek santan*, one of the Minangkabau characters is firm in preserving the identity and ethnicity. This means that black is not caused by charcoal, yellow is not caused by turmeric, and delicious is not caused by coconut milk. As the ethnic Minangkabau practice merantau, living in other countries, they have many interactions and adaptation with other ethnic groups. However, the proverb '*dimana bumi dipijak disitu langi dijujung*' means 'do as the Romans do', but the preservation of cultural identity is equally important as the adaptation of the culture. As per their proverb, "*masuk kandang harimau mangaum, masuk kandang kambing membebek*" means "coming into a tiger cage one ought to roar, coming into a goat cage one ought to quack." The ideology needs values system preserved under strong power intervention and when the autonomy was started, the wish to return to Nagari directly come up.

An external factor is a continuous and merciless intervention of the colonial and national governments in an unsynchronic format. In the Minangkabau context, the notes of dynamic dialects between the local and national dialects took a considerable amount of time. As a minority population of Indonesia, the Minangkabau have contributed many public figures in all fields during the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia (Chaniago, 2010; Ajisman, 2011; Saydam, 2009; Zed et al, 1998). One of the indicators is the fact that three of the four founding fathers of Indonesia, except Sukarno, were Minangkabaus. These men are Muhammad Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir, and Tan Malaka (Hasanuddin, 2019). During the formation of a state, Minangkabau contributed many ideas, including the fourth pillar of Pancasila and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR).

Both concepts are applied in the *nagari* system. According to Umar Kayam (1989), Minangkabau ethnicity is the only ethnic group that has a tradition of democracy. The concept, however, has been marginalized and ignored. As a result of this condition, the Revolutionary Government of Republic of Indonesia (PRRI, 1958-1961) escalated to an ultimatum of disintegration if it is not addressed. That movement was destroyed by Sukarno draconianly (Bahar and Zulfan, 2004; Kahin, 2005; Hasanuddin, 2018)). In light of this situation, Minangkabau people have been embarrassed and humiliated and have lost their self-confidence. Despite the efforts to restore 'self-esteem' during the Suharto era, nagari governments are still not establishing their identity. As a result of the reformation order, the Pancasila democratic system nearly collapsed to be replaced by a liberal democratic system that legalized the direct election of village heads. According to article 1 paragraph (2) of the original 1945 Constitution, the People's Consultative Assembly is sterilized to function as the executor of the people's sovereignty.

The *Nagari* was previously the highest autonomous political unit at the regional level, a mini state, but due to the intervention of the colonial and national governments, it has been degraded to the lowest government. Various foreign models like territorial unit system and vice versa village system has interfered—not to say 'spoiled'—their *nagari* system. Due to its adaptation, the egalitarian and democratic systems have become weaker as well as their critical strength has diminished. After such a prolonged intervention, the young generation has lost the knowledge and the cultural memories of the principles of the customary order of things. The results of many foreign influences, as well as the influence of Islamic values strongly embraced by the Minangkabau people up to now, have caused numerous transitions such as extended family becoming nuclear family, as well as changes in the systems of marriage, inheritance, father's authority versus uncle, etc. (Hasanuddin, 2017). Consequently, the young generation today considers learning Minangkabau culture to be similar to learning a foreign language. Consequently, the fears of the Minangkabau culture becoming extinct can serve as a great source of energy to mobilize the return to *Nagari* movement when the opportunity arises.

The "return to *Nagari*" requires the

construction of a comprehensive system and organization, as well as the revitalization of the operational and functional values. During the reconstruction process, it is important to take into account the elements of material infrastructure as well as social structures guided by the original ideology. As a traditional social and political unit, nagari constitutes the highest level of autonomy. The prerequisite of the *nagari* autonomy is that it has the infrastructure as regulated by the Nagari Law, that consists of 16 articles, they are: *bakorong-bakampuang*, *basuku-banagari*, *babalai-bamusajik*, *bahuma-babendang*, *balabuah-batapian*, *basawah-baladang*, *bahalaman-bapamedanan*, dan *bapandam-bapusaro* (Navis 1984, 91-92). *Bakorong-bakampuang* means that a nagari must have a territory with a certain boundaries. Besides that, *basuku banagari*, a *nagari* must have a population of at least four clans. The meaning of *babalai bamusajik* indicate the existence of nagari government that covers the legislative, executive, and judicative that is centered in *balairung* (customary hall) as a facility for government, meeting, and law enforcement. And *musajik* (mosque) as facilities for education, worship, and religious education. *Bahuma babendang* is the requirements for the existence of fortress (*huma*) and the lightning system (*bendang*). In addition, there are other requirements related to transportation facilities and their management, as well as traffic, trade, and sanitation facilities as indicated by *balabuah* (roads) and *batapian* (irrigation and sanitation facilities). Agriculture land is another more important facility as mentioned in the phrase *basawah baladang* (rice field and garden) as the community economic basis as well as its management process and its inheritance law. Similar to the neighborhood association system, the management of parties, sports, and games (*bahalaman-bapamedanan*). Finally, we have the ritual of handling death and the public cemetery (*bapandam bapusaro*).

The social structure of the *nagari* is characterized by family system, kinship, politics, and government. Nagaris are given the opportunity to be different from one another as defined in the principle of "*adat salingka nagari*," which means they are able to enforce customary laws within the scope of their respective nagaris. There are two main models of the government, known as *lareh nan duo*. They are *Lareh Koto Piliang* (aristocracy)

and *Lareh Bodi Chaniago* (democracy) (Azwar et al. 2018, 2019, 2020). The *nagari* has assimilated with Islam since the 13th century. The *nagari* develops the autonomous government system, independent disputes resolution, tiered deliberative body system from the lowest level (from *paruik, kaum, suku* up to *nagari*, the participation of male and female adult, and the principle of consultation for a total consensus (Keddie, 1987). Social political unity and the highest territory have been replaced by the lowest government unit equivalent to the village as a result of functional change, castration of the customary institutions and the use of external forces in an attempt to eradicate the local and traditional institutions which have existed for hundreds of years (Zed, Utama, and Chaniago; 1998). All must be revitalized. In this modern age, maintaining the traditional characteristics seems strange since more than half of the population lives in other parts of Indonesia (Chadwick, 1991), yet a return to Nagari remains a viable option. In spite of the many new problems that arise regarding the return to the Nagari institutional structure, including the merging of previously divided areas into villages, the nagari multiethnic problems, the limitations of nagari resources, control by investors over customary land assets, and the control of finance and administration (McCarthy, 2005; Warman, 2010; Beckmann, 2013), the desire to return cannot be stopped. 'Return to Nagari' is not a merely a nostalgic idealism. The *nagari* that is desired has double functions, besides the smallest administration unit, it is also the highest customary institution. According to the philosophy and the customary code of *Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah*, "the customs are based on religions, and religions are based on the Qur'an", the Al Quran was used as the superstructure ideology to guide the practical implementation of the return to Nagari as wished.

In this study, it appears that the discourse 'return to *Nagari*' serves as a special response to Indonesian decentralization policies (Vel and Bedner, 2015), whereas Bali assumes decentralization is an integral part of Indonesian policy, as a result of which political power toward the central government is broken (Nordholt, 2007). The findings of this study are supported by the research conducted by Zainal Arifin (2017) about *Nagari Ba-Ampek Suku*, and by Azwar et al. As a result of such a special response, nagari governance

values are revitalized in its birth land of West Sumatra, while also preventing disintegration from the central government.

This research indicates that the Provincial Regulation 7/2018 regarding the nagari, while not yet implemented, follows the customary principles of ideal nagari in Minangkabau. In that local law, the functional structure has been restored (a) *ninik mamak* serves as a matrilineal who essentially holds the mandate of the people's sovereignty (his nephews in the Nagari), (b) revitalizing the representative deliberation system, and (c) restructuring the customary institution (KAN), Head of Nagari and Customary Nagari Court, which reflect the proto-triad politics of Minangkabau. Thus, this Provincial Regulation 7/2018 cancels the previous practiced structure (the Provincial Regulations 9/2000 and 2/2007) considered unsuitable since it is not based on local culture. Nevertheless, all KAN members except for *ninik mamak* must be excluded from the organization. Governments at the local level, such as the regency and municipality, should develop a follow-up policy.

Recommendation Model

A text analysis has revealed that the *nagari* desired model should refer to a traditional indigenous construction, such as the banyan tree whose roots are the people, the stem is the units of people organized into four clans, and the branches and leaves are the People's Representative and Consultative Assembly. Therefore, the structure of the *nagari* institution should be (1) The People's Consultative Assembly known as KAN whose members are the *ninik mamak* (public figure) of the clan, act as people representative (for their own clan) at the same time as the executor of: people power, legislative function, election of the head of *nagari* and head the *nagari* justice, (2) The *Kapalo Nagari* (Nagari Government), consists of head of *nagari* assisted by assistants to execute the legislative functions, and (3) The *Paradilan Nagari* (Nagari Court), consists of Head, clerks, judges as the executor of judicative functions that can be filled by all components of community that meet the required competencies. That model is depicted in the illustration (Figure 1).

The illustration in Figure 1 can be explained as follows:

- (1) The people or the population consists of




Figure: The illustration of Banyan tree genealogical structure of the nagari institution

graded matriclan units: *samande* (the smallest family unit consists of a grandmother, several mothers and her bothers, the children from the mothers); *saparuiik* (combination of several *samande* families); *sakaum* (combination of several *saparuiik* families); and *sasuku* (combination of several *sakaum* families).

- (2) A *nagari* must have at least four matriclans. A matriclan is lead by a chief named by *Pangulu*.
- (3) There are four professional human resources in each *nagari*, namely: the intellectuals (*cadiak pandai*), the religious public figures (*alim ulama*), the female public figure (*bundo kanduang*), and the youth (*parik paga*).
- (4) All *Pengulu* are the members of the Consultative Institution (*Karapatan Pangulu/ KP*), as a Representative Institution (*Lembaga Perwakilan/ LP*) and at the same time functions as a Deliberative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan/ MP*), and the executor of the *nagari* legislation. They have the highest power and authority.
- (5) The *Kapalo Nagari* (head of *nagari* executive) and the *Paradilan Nagari* (head of the *nagari*

justice) are elected by and responsible for the *KP/ LP/ MP* institutions.

The above explanation shows that conceptually, the result of this research proves the concrete relation between the discourse with the identity, the reality, and the social relation (also multicultural politics and other social dimensions). Ideas, attitudes, actions and social realities are recorded from the discourse and to be represented in texts. Further more, the discourse has a dialectic relation with the social, law, culture, and humanities dimension. The discourse contributes to the social relation construction, criticize it, and do some conceptual improvements needed for a better social order. In other words, Discourse directs the social structure formation historically, shows a diachronic change, and is one of the aspects of the social practice.

V. CONCLUSION

As can be seen from the description above, it is not easy to return to the *nagari*. The road has been quite winding and will continue to be so. This study demonstrates that for the Minangkabau local government system, the textual construction of

'*nagari*' as the home to return to 'kembali' should be improved for perfection. Central government commitment and policy have created an opportunity, related policies are continuously improved; local policy formulation is inevitable. The program of 'return to Nagari' must be based on indigenous principles, which include genealogical, historical, territorial, capital, customary, democratic, and administrative principles. Destruction on one element will loosen all the joints. There is a strong unity among geologic clans in order to unite all population with their own leader, who represents their aspirations and is part of the supreme power in the People's Consultative Assembly (KAN). It is the historical unity that allows all people to be connected to a customary, cultural, and ethical network. The genealogical and historic unity is related to strong acquisition of the territorial area. The territory is the capital for ensuring the welfare of all people in the *nagari*. In traditional societies, the management of population and territory is governed by custom. The custom decides that the decision is made democratically: consultation for consensus, including for choosing the head of *nagari*. As part of modern management systems, only the administration aspect can be accepted as a new value.

This finding highlights the importance of discursive practices in showing actors' awareness of their culture that will lead them to express clear cultural-political attitudes towards the state. The status of their cultural traditions is under threat, so we are mobilizing them to revive, maintain, keep, consolidate and revitalize their identities. Actors' perceptions of intercultural relations polarize due to weakening historical understanding and reduced active involvement in their development. As a result of the multicultural interaction, differences do not have to be abolished, however, a dynamic reformation must be encouraged and each other must be completed. The choice is not to adopt each other but to maintain a dynamic tension between them (Fay, 2002). Thus, Indonesia, which is both vertically and horizontally complex (like America and India), is using multiculturalism as an ideology both internally and externally. On an internal level, the operation of that ideology is manifested as

revitalization of the primordial values, enrichment of those values through multicultural interaction, and affirmation of relationship construction as a synthesis. It operates externally by accommodating the ideology within a national or global framework that tolerates difference, supports equality, and promotes democracy. Despite the fact that both orientations of the operational ideology are needed at the same time, ethnic identity affirmation serves as a 'differentiating' factor on the one hand, while integrating it into multiculturalism serves as a 'enriching' factor on the other. Hence, multiculturalism can serve as a mosaic or a meaningful flower garden, as well as revitalizing Nagari government systems in their homeland, including West Sumatra, is a way to value Indonesian multicultural nationalism in its fullest form.

This study is still limited to a descriptive and prescriptive description of the *nagari* and its ideal and operational governmental structure. Further studies that should be done are (1) the variant of the *nagari* political system that is different from one to another, which significantly summarized in the metaphor: *adat salingka nagari* (the custom in the scope of *nagari*), with the various leadership system and autocratic, democratic, and or deliberative government, (2) the structure of the *nagari* government as a whole that covers functional and structural relation among three pillars of the *nagari* political power, i.e. legislative, executive, and judicative (traditional triad politics) to be believed to have been developed since one thousand years ago in Minangkabau.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was supported by the *LPDP Kemenkeu Republik Indonesia* -UIN Imam Bonjol (Grant Numbers PRJ-63/LPDP/2019) and *KRP2GB-PTU-Unand* (Grant Numbers: 87/UN.16.17/PP.PGB/LPPM/2018). We are very grateful for the support from LPPM Universitas Andalas and UIN IB, FIB Unand, UPT Pusat Bahasa Unand, and other parties for contributing the facilities, the finance, and the constructive ideas.

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